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ABSTRACT 
Within the marketing window for perishables such as food products, demand uncertainty is complicated by price 
sensitivity and propensity to postpone purchase that is heterogeneous across consumers.  These features pose 
substantial challenges to retailers when pricing multiple products over time and across consumer segments.  Getting 
the dynamic profile of prices right has implications for performance of vertical food chains ranging from revenues to 
food waste. This paper proposes an approach to dynamic pricing that is demonstrated to improve performance 
within this setting.  
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1 Introduction 
Perishability of products follows from physical and functional obsolescence. While the former may 
predictable, the latter  depends on uncertain demand as consumers switch to substitute products. 
Uncertainty faced by firms is further complicated by postponement of purchase by consumers.  A key 
management control within this context is pricing. As demand and product characteristics are dynamic, 
pricing must also be recognized as a dynamic problem. Setting the wrong intertemporal price profile can 
result in inventory accumulation or stock-outs, as well as inefficient profiles of product deterioration, or 
ending stocks. Suboptimal pricing may leave ending stocks and waste disposal cost. In each case, these 
implications can imply high costs associated with uncertainty. Setting the wrong prices across a set of 
substitute products may result in unintended changes in demand as consumers switch products.   
A further complication results from heterogeneity of consumers that compose the demand faced by the 
firm. We consider two types of heterogeneity. Consumers differ with respect to price sensitivity, see e.g. 
Narasimhan (1984), Levedahl (1988), Vilcassim et al. (1987), and Gerstner et al. (1994).  Second, 
consumers may differ by the timing of their purchase within the product life.  Postponement of purchase 
may be strategic based on anticipated price discounts or may reflect a willingness to trade-off quality for 
price. By setting price directly or indirectly using segment directed discounts or coupons, uniform posted 
prices can be differentiated across consumer segments. To manage these costs and resulting profitability 
of perishables, firms must establish a pricing policy that defines the intertemporal price profile, as well as 
prices across substitute products and heterogeneous consumers.  
The stochastic properties demand for perishables are difficult to characterize.  From this perspective, our 
approach is to treat demand as uncertain and, following Knight ’s suggestion, to distinguish this 
uncertainty from risk where stochastic properties of demand can be characterized by a particular 
distribution and optimal pricing derived from a risk neutral optimization problem.  Further, our approach 
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presumes the retailer has market power. As argued in the applied I/O literature, spatial separation of food 
retailers often establishes spatial local pricing power.  Even when competitive conditions may set price, 
mark-downs or discounts in either the primary market or secondary channels are typically used at the 
firm-level to establish price profiles that set prices below or at the market price. To the best of our 
knowledge, the question of how to determine the optimal intertemporal price profile for perishables with 
uncertain demand and product substitution has not been considered in past literature.  
Consideration of the problem of pricing perishable food products has received very limited attention.   
Past literature has considered food products and offered a theory that retailers set price as a markup over 
farm price as reviewed by Wohlgenant (2001). Such pricing ignores product perishability as well as the 
dynamic profile of uncertainty of demand. Observed retail pricing suggests occasional promotional sales 
are often used at the end of predicted product life following a period of fixed price, Li et al. (2006).   A key 
feature of food products is their perishability. Within the short marketing window that characterizes most 
perishable food and ag products, demand is typically highly stochastic, spatially specific, difficult to 
predict, and reflects substitution across products by heterogeneous consumers. This combination of 
features poses substantial challenges to retailers when pricing products over time, across products, over 
spatial dimensions, and across consumer segments. By ignoring perishability, stocks at the end of product 
life amount to food waste.  
2 Dynamic pricing strategies 
Consider a supplier that coordinates production of J perishable products that are marketable within a 
finite time horizon with dates Tt ,...1,0 . Demand is heterogeneous and is characterized by S consumer 
segments with each segment noted as },...,2,1{0 SSs   where the value of s is interpreted as 
indicating market segment such that as s increases, consumers have preferences for progressively higher 
quality that is reflected in higher price. We note that this specification is consistent with the existence of 
alternative market channels. We define demand for each market segment as 
1 2
( ) { ( ), ( ),....., ( )}
j j j j
s S
t t t t     for product j for Jj ,...,1 .  
We consider only the marketing problem and suppose initial stocks are pre-determined by prior 
production decisions. At any time t in the season, the supplier offers a 1 x J vector of fixed supplies 
))(),...,(()(
1
tqtqtq
J
sss   to each segment s that represents remaining inventory given initial stocks 
of )0(jsq . Thus, operationally the firm is faced with sunk costs for an inventory that must be sold before 
the end of the season.  Here, we suppose the control available to achieve this goal is the intertemporal 
price policy. The intertemporal price policy defines a sequence of prices over time within the product life, 
as well as across substitute products and market segments. That is, the firm chooses a price vector for 
each time Tt ,...1,0 incorporating a price )(tp
j
s  for each product j for Jj ,...,1  and for each market 
segment s for Ss ,...,1 to maximize revenue.  This specification allows the firm to set price policy for 
each product that is jointly optimal across products given that other products may be cannibalized.   
By definition, uncertainty describes conditions when a firm anticipates stochastic factors will  affect its 
performance, however, the firm has limited knowledge of the mechanism generating the stochastic 
outcomes. In contrast, full knowledge of such mechanisms is presumed when a stochastic environment is 
described as posing risk. Given knowledge of characterizing moments of data generating mechanism, a 
natural approach to decision-making under risk is to suppose decision-makers have preferences over such 
moments and set controls to optimize a functional representation of those preferences.  An example is risk 
neutral preferences that motivate expected profit maximization. In sharp contrast, under uncertainty, 
knowledge of the shape of the distribution of stochastic factors or its moments, are not assumed.  Here, 
we propose use of robust optimization to set performance controls in uncertain decision environments.  
Robust optimization for a single control problem has been recently presented by Lan, et al. (2008) and 
Birbil, et al. (2009). Our specification considers robust pricing across a set of substitutable products where 
demand across a spectrum of heterogeneous customer segments is uncertain. Our approach builds on 
Soyster (1973) and Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (1999).  The intuition of the robust optimization approach is 
simple. While the distribution of stochastic features of problem may be unknown, the decision maker may 
be able to define boundaries of variation. Using simulation across the bounded set of possible stochastic 
outcomes, the best choice can be made.  
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Case 1: Dynamic perishable pricing under risk and risk neutral preferences  
We first consider the case of risk neutral dynamic pricing or equivalently where the firm forecasts demand 
based on a known distribution of stochastic demand, accepting those forecasts as its expectations.  Where 
the firm’s objective is linear in the stochastic factors, such an approach is equivalent to one where the 
firm is risk neutral, having preferences only for the first moment of a known distribution over the 
stochastic factor. Given fixed initial supply, the firm seeks a pricing strategy to maximize revenue and 
ensure zero ending stocks. Product substitutability implies that demand for a product j depends on the 
prices for a product j as well as those for other products in the product set, noted as a vector with 
subscript, j  , or where particular products are indexed with superscript k.  We specify demand as 
follows:  
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Our specification considers demand by segment s such that discrete choices by consumers across the 
product set define a continuous function in prices.  Together, the specified system for J products can be 
viewed as a first-order Taylor series approximation of a complete demand system. We suppose demand is 
a negative monotonic function of the own price j and that of substitutes –j. Maglaras and Meissner (2006) 
or Perakis and Sood (2006) present similar specifications.  We interpret the parameters 
)(ta
j
s
)1( 

TJS  as defining the market potential (i.e. maximum quantitative scale) for product j and 
segment s at time t. We view market potential as stochastic. The parameters )1()( 
TJSj
s t  and 
)(t
j
s  
)1( 

TJS  represent price sensitivity of products j and –j, respectively. Note that our 
specification assumes consumers prefer to substitute products available in their segment rather than 
downgrading or upgrading to other segments. This is consistent with consumer loyalty found across 
particular market channels, stores, or branded versus private label products.  We incorporate this 
specification by requiring that products are differentiated by market segment such that each product type 
j will be differentiated by market segment s such that its price will increase with s, see Birbil, et al. (2009) 
for a similar specification.  
The firm’s pricing problem is complicated by a mismatch between product availability and time of 
purchase within the product’s life. That is, observation suggests consumers do not purchase 
instantaneously when initial supply is provided to the market. We consider this problem as a passive 
feature of demand, rather than a result of strategic behavior by consumers.  This seems reasonable as 
product quality diminishes over product life. To differentiate quantity purchased from level of demand at 
any time, we define the proportion of demand that is postponed by customers each time period as 
)(t
j
s
)1( 

TJS and allow it to vary across segments and products. From the firm’s perspective, the 
delayed purchase demand amounts to a shift of demand to future periods during the finite product life.  
We define the cumulative demand function given postponement at any time t as: 
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Intuitively, this specification includes demand that is based on delayed demand postponed from last 
period (in the first expression in the squared-brackets) and that portion of current demand that will be 
postponed to next period (based on the second expression in the squared-brackets). In the absence of 
replenishment, the firm controls available inventory by setting price to maximize the season’s revenue 
given stochastic demand across consumer segments and substitute products.  
We first consider optimal pricing under a risk setting. Within this problem as summarized below, we 
suppose the firm chooses price policy to set a dynamic profile of prices over time, across substitute 
products, and across consumer segments to maximize expected revenue equation (1) based on an 
expectation of delayed demand. To conserve notation, we define expected market potential using a 
redefined notation, ( )
j
s
a t . We assume initial supply of the product is fixed and exogenous to the pricing 
problem. In the beginning, a fixed initial stock of each product is available, equation (6). At any time 
during the product life, expected demand, equation (4), is affected by postponement of purchase, 
equation (3), available supply is reduced each period, equation (2) and available supply must be positive 
or zero, equation (5). Thus, we do not constrain ending stock to be zero as that may not make economic 
sense. We constrain the price policy to ensure that prices are nonnegative, equation (7), that prices across 
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segments are ordered, equation (8), that prices are set such that demand will be nonnegative, equation 
(9), and we assume demand at zero prices will not reflect any delayed purchases, equation (10).  The firm 
is assumed to be risk neutral and draws forecasts of demand intercepts as random parameters from 
known independent stochastic density functions. Given risk neutrality, we specify the risk neutral optimal 
pricing problem as one of expected revenue maximization:  
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Case 2: Robust dynamic pricing for perishable under uncertainty 
Define stochastic potential demand as 
j for each product and consumer segment as having a best estimate 
( )
j
s
a t . Define the uncertainty set dU for stochastic potential demand as 
j as bounded by limits that are 
set by a scaling parameter ( )
j
s
t that scales our best estimate as in equation (11). 
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Thus, rather than supposing the agent has knowledge of the stochastic distribution of potential demand, 
in case 2 our specification supposes the manager holds a best estimate as well as a scaling parameter that 
defines limits on the set from which the manager presumes the stochastic potential demand is drawn.  
Alternative specifications such as ellipsoidal and polyhedral uncertainty sets are considered by Ben-Tal 
and Nemirovski (1999) and Bertsimas and Sim (2004). For a particular uncertainty set, suppose an optimal 
price policy is derived from the revenue maximizing problem describe above.  It follows that the control 
problem has infinite number of constraints that describe possible uncertainty sets.  Since a direct solution 
of such a problem is intractable, we manipulate the specification to transform the control problem to an 
equivalent, workable form. Specifically, we define a scalar V as the objective in (12) subject to the 
constraint in (13) which implies that at the optimum (13) is an equality.  We propose the following 
deterministic problem as equivalent to the robust formulation with uncertain demand (derivation is 
available from authors): 
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(1), however, defines V as a scalar value of the objective to be optimized.  
3 Evaluation dynamic pricing policies under risk versus uncertainty 
In this section, we compare our robust price policy against the price policy based on a forecast-based, risk 
neutral model. First, we present optimal price policies and inventories for each of the models derived 
from a numerical example. Next, we consider how the robust policy varies as the extent of uncertainty 
varies across a set of randomly generated scenarios.  
In our numerical experiments, we assume that consumer segment 1 focuses on the highest quality and 
priced products. Parameters for numerical experiments are given in Table 1. We limit our consideration to 
demand parameters satisfying a particular segmentation of the consumer population based on ranking 
defined as:  
Definition 1. Customer segment s is of a rank that is higher than that of segment 's  if )()( ' tata
j
s
j
s  , 
)()( ' tt
j
s
j
s   , and )()( ' tt
j
s
j
s    for tj, .  
We assume demand parameters satisfy Definition 1. This implies as s decreases, segment rank increases, 
and market potential and price sensitivity decreases.  We specify parameters to allow a sharp focus on 
own-price sensitivity, so cross-price effects )(tjs are specified as equal for the two products as are the 
postponement proportions )(tjs . The first three rows of Table 1 define values for the demand 
parameters. Demand for product 1 is parameterized as having greater market scale with values for as 
j 
that are greater than those used for product 2. Own price response βs 
j
 for product 1 is about 10% less 
than that for product 2. The products are parameterized as substitutes though not strong substitutes.  20% 
of demand is delayed by consumers each period as shown by s 
j
. Initially, we assume a low degree of 
uncertainty, using s 
j = 0.02. We suppose initial stocks q j are smaller for segment 1 consumers than 
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segment 2, and larger for product 1 than for product 2. The simulation experiments were implemented 
using MATLAB and GAMS on a machine with Windows XP OS, T2300 CPU, 1.66 GHz, and 1 GB RAM.  
Table 1. 
Parameters for simulation studies. Case: J=2, S=2, T=10. 
Parameters 
Product 1 Product 2 
Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 1 Segment 2 
)(ta
j
s  
60 120 30 100 
)(t
j
s  0.5 1.5 0.6 1.6 
)(t
j
s  0.1 0.3 0.1 0.3 
)(t
j
s  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
)(t
j
s  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
)0(
j
q  100 400 80 300 
 
The optimal price strategies and inventory policies are shown in Figure 1. In the figure, solid and dotted 
lines represent optimal dynamic pricing strategy based on risk neutrality and expected demand and on 
our robust strategy based on uncertain demand, respectively. Red and blue lines are the strategies for 
segment 1 and 2, respectively. In the top-two panels, the product price dynamic profiles are presented. In 
the lower two panels, the inventory profiles over time induced by the price policy are presented.  
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Figure 1. Dynamic price and inventory strategies 
 
For each product, segment 1 prices are set above those set for segment 2.  In both cases, a fixed price is 
not found to be optimal. Instead, initial price decreases are optimal, followed by a period of stable price.  
We view this initial price decrease as a means of clearing inventory given observed demand conditions no 
apparent in the initial time period. As shown in Figure 1, this price discounting increases sales and draws 
down inventory in the first period and prices are re-adjusted upward and maintained there until later 
periods when further discounting is set and maintained until inventory is cleared to an optimal level.  
Under uncertainty, results show that optimal price strategy sets prices lower than does a price policy 
drawn from risk neutral optimization. This is consistent with aversion to future uncertainty that leads to 
pricing that induces greater sales early in the season to eliminate possible lost sales.  As demand is 
uncertain, pricing is assumed to be adjusted to best clear inventories while optimizing the objective. 
Looking across market segments, we find the price for segment 1 is much higher than the price for 
segment 2 reflecting the economic benefits of differentiation. A similar price difference across segments 
is found under both demand conditions. For the inventories, we see that for the problem specified it is 
not optimal to set prices to clear inventories. We see optimal pricing results in some waste. We found that 
robust strategies for product 1 are nearly but not identical to those associated with the risk neutral case. 
The inventory trajectories for product 2 vary between the two market segments, however, in both 
segments inventories are drawn down faster under the uncertainty case with robust optimization . We 
consider the revenue outcomes next within a study of the implications of the level of uncertainty.   
To consider sensitivity of firm revenue to the extent or level of uncertainty, we consider the implications 
of the value for )(t
j
s . Intuitively, this parameter indicates the extent to which the bounds that define the 
uncertainty set differ from the best estimate of market potential, as 
j . We simulate across the following 
set of values for )(t
j
s : [ 2%, 5%, 7%, 10%, 15%]. This results in uncertainty defined by the limits of 
possible values increasing by 4%, 10%, 14%, 20% and 30%, respectively. Thus, for the uncertainty case, we 
derive five robust price strategy trajectories that can be compared to the risk neutral dynamic pricing 
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policy. Based on derived price trajectories, we generate random demand sets from a uniform distribution 
to generate demand realizations that define a set of scenarios. We draw our levels of market potential 
from the interval ))](1)(()),(1)(([ ttatta js
j
s
j
s
j
s   . We derive 50 realizations (scenarios) for each 
setting.  For each scenario, we derive corresponding revenue trajectories based on optimal dynamic price 
trajectories. To compare results, we note the risk neutral dynamic price trajectories (D) and robust 
trajectories (R) and, for each scenario, we report in Table 2 the optimal value (ov), as well as minimum 
(min), maximum (max), average (ave), and standard deviation (sd) of objective values.  
Table 2. 
Revenue characteristics under differing extents of uncertainty 
  ovD  ovR  maxD  maxR  minD  minR  aveD  aveR  sdD  sdR  
0.02 
4.9712e+
004 
4.6854e+
004 
5.0784e+
004 
5.1757e+
004 
4.9178e+
004 
4.9876e+
004 
4.9861e+
004 
5.0743e+
004 
359.5613 331.9319 
0.05 
4.9712e+
004 
4.4984e+
004 
5.2824e+
004 
5.7034e+
004 
4.8641e+
004 
5.2732e+
004 
5.0463e+
004 
5.4621e+
004 
944.2957 910.4214 
0.07 
4.9712e+
004 
4.3783e+
004 
5.3800e+
004 
6.0095e+
004 
4.6941e+
004 
5.3378e+
004 
5.0089e+
004 
5.6313e+
004 
1.5416e+
003 
1.4640e+
003 
0.1 
4.9712e+
004 
4.1946e+
004 
5.4003e+
004 
6.2711e+
004 
4.7689e+
004 
5.6926e+
004 
5.0485e+
004 
5.9412e+
004 
1.6425e+
003 
1.4787e+
003 
0.15 
4.9712e+
004 
3.7643e+
004 
5.5573e+
004 
6.5213e+
004 
4.5801e+
004 
5.7144e+
004 
5.1140e+
004 
6.1633e+
004 
2.6568e+
003 
2.2816e+
003 
 
From the simulations of this experiment, robust optimization solutions are shown to be more stable 
(based on standard deviation) than risk neutral-based price policy, i.e. sdR  < sdD  across each value of .  
This result supports the recommendation that to stabilize revenue the adoption of robust price strategies 
be pursued relative to forecast-based strategies. However, it is natural to ask what is the cost with respect 
to revenue achievable? Table 2 shows that ovD > ovR . However, we note that as revenue is stochastic, the 
optimum may not be achievable. Instead, we consider the average revenue which shows that aveD < aveR  
at all levels of uncertainty. Thus, our robust pricing policy provides both an improved average outcome as 
well as reduced variation in revenue as we found sdR  < sdD . 
The dominance of our robust dynamic pricing is further supported by considering minimum, maximum 
revenues achievable. Further, Table 2 shows that the values of ovR  are decreasing in the amount of 
uncertainty and smaller than ovD . Across each metric for each level of uncertainty, Table 2 shows our 
proposed robust dynamic pricing under uncertainty outperforms the risk neutral dynamic pricing that only 
considers risk.   
4 Conclusions and further studies 
In this paper, we have presented two dynamic pricing models: i) risk neutral optimization and ii) a robust 
optimization under uncertainty. Robust optimization allows the price policy to be derived such that is 
guarantees performance falls within specified boundaries given the degree of uncertainty. In other words, 
our robust models can prevent a loss associated with significant demand decreases that fall outside of 
such boundaries. In this way, relative to risk neutral pricing, our robust pricing is found to reduce ending 
inventories which are specified as waste in our model.  
Our experiments for these dynamic pricing approaches show that the robust price strategies are very 
stable across different degrees of uncertainty and differing demand parameterizations.  Even if a firm 
encounters a sudden and significant negative demand shock, a certain range of performance is 
guaranteed by the robust policy and this ensures that our robust approach dominates the risk neutral 
dynamic pricing policy.    
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APPENDIX. Derivation of Robust Optimization model 
By addressing uncertainty set (A.12) and manipulating objective function, we have 
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Note that the constraint (A.12) makes infinite number of constraints for the revenue maximizing problem. 
Thus, we need to manipulate this constraint.  
Here, we know that constraint (A.5) over (A.12) can be reformulated as follows: 
0)()()()())(1)((
)()()()()())(),((
,
,







tpttpttta
tpttpttatptp
k
s
k
s
jkJk
j
s
j
s
j
s
j
s
k
s
k
s
jkJk
j
s
j
s
j
s
j
s
j
s
j
s


 
Also, manipulation of (A.11) and (A.4) gives us: 
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The constraint (A.6) and the above equation becomes  
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From the (A.7), we have (A.6) over (A.12) as follows: 
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Also, the constraint (A.2) 
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Finally, we have (11)-(16). 
